Civil Litigation

Defamation Law

Defamation n. [From Latin diffamare, "to spread abroad by report"]

The act of making a false and defamatory statement concerning another, published to a third party, which tends to injure reputation or diminish the esteem in which the person is held by right-thinking members of society.

Grigoras Law acts for clients across Ontario in defamation matters, including libel, slander, and online reputation disputes. We represent individuals, professionals, and organizations—whether advancing or defending claims—moving quickly with injunctions, anti-SLAPP motions, and content removal where required.

What We Do

Defamation Services

Your Legal Team

Your Defamation Counsel

Denis Grigoras

Denis Grigoras

Counsel, Civil & Appellate Litigation

  • Successful anti-SLAPP motion (2024 ONSC 792)
  • Online defamation and search de-indexing matters
  • Interlocutory injunctions and publication restraints
View Profile

Representative Work

Selected Defamation Matters

  • Successful anti-SLAPP motion — 2024 ONSC 792

    Published Decision

    Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Defamation proceeding

    Motion granted; claim dismissed at an early stage on public-interest grounds.

    Read decision on CanLII
  • Media inquiries on government-contract scrutiny

    Media Relations

    Media relations · Time-sensitive response strategy

    Strategic counsel in responding to high-profile media inquiries.

  • Dismissal dispute with sexual-misconduct allegations

    Workplace

    Workplace statements · Reputation and employment

    Counsel in a defamation claim arising from a disputed termination.

  • Contentious municipal election campaign

    Political Speech

    Political speech · Public interest

    Counsel in a defamation claim related to statements during an election.

  • False police complaints

    Defamation

    Defamatory accusations · Complaint escalation

    Counsel in a defamation claim arising from false reports to police.

  • Removal of defamatory social-media posts

    Platform Takedown

    Platform policy takedown · Cross-platform coordination

    Counsel to a client involving removal of defamatory content.

ON THIS PAGE

WHAT IS DEFAMATION?

Defamation law in Ontario offers individuals and entities a legal recourse when their reputations are unjustly harmed by false statements. In essence, defamation involves the making or publishing of false communications that tend to lower someone’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. Defamation comprises both libel (often tied to written or permanently recorded expressions) and slander (commonly oral or otherwise transient). A fundamental tension underpins defamation law: on one side stands the protection of individual reputation, while on the other lies freedom of expression—a right safeguarded under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Courts strive to reconcile these interests by imposing liability for wrongful falsehoods while preserving space for robust public debate, fair commentary, and honest reporting. To make a successful claim, plaintiffs typically must show three core elements: (1) a statement was defamatory, (2) it referred—explicitly or implicitly—to the plaintiff, and (3) it was “published” or communicated to at least one third party. Once these prerequisites are met, liability will attach unless the defendant establishes a recognized legal defence that justifies or excuses the publication. Defamation claims can arise in numerous settings, including social media posts, news articles, opinion pieces, internal corporate memos, workplace discussions, or televised broadcasts. A statement can be defamatory even if it appears as a suggestion or insinuation. Consequences for a liable defendant may range from an order to pay damages (monetary compensation) to a court injunction prohibiting further dissemination. Yet Ontario law also recognizes that certain statements must remain free from the chilling effect of defamation suits, such as fair comment on matters of public interest or carefully vetted investigative journalism. As a result, the law includes a range of defences, each reflecting a policy choice about when it is preferable to shield speech, even if reputational harm occurs.

DEFAMATORY STATEMENT MUST REFER TO THE PLAINTIFF

What is a Defamatory Statement

A defamatory statement is one that would cause a reasonable person to think less of, despise, or ridicule the subject. The question is whether an ordinary, right-thinking individual, reading or hearing the words in their natural context, would view them as harmful to the plaintiff’s reputation. Courts have recognized that defamatory meaning can be direct (“You are a thief”) or indirect through innuendo or implication (“There’s missing money, and we all know who’s responsible”).

Determining whether a statement is defamatory involves examining its “sting.” This “sting” must be harmful to reputation, though minor insults or name-calling may not necessarily suffice if they lack serious consequences. Additionally, context matters. A seemingly innocuous phrase in one setting can be defamatory in another if it implies disreputable conduct or moral failings.

Must Refer to the Plaintiff

The impugned statement must refer to the plaintiff, either by explicit identification or by inference. It is not mandatory for the plaintiff to be named outright—defamation can arise if listeners or readers recognize that the statement targets the plaintiff due to surrounding circumstances or identifying details. For instance, describing “the manager of a certain local bank” in a small community might effectively point to a single individual if there is only one bank manager in town. In deciding whether a statement refers to the plaintiff, courts ask whether a reasonable person would make the connection. If no such connection exists, the claim fails on this element.

HOW IS A DEFAMATORY STATEMENT PUBLISHED? (WHAT IS "PUBLICATION?")

Publication means communicating the defamatory statement to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Without third-party communication, a statement (no matter how offensive) cannot found a defamation action. Publication can be direct, as with a broadcast, newspaper article, social media post, or blog entry. It can also be indirect, such as emailing a defamatory remark to a colleague who then forwards it, expanding readership. Importantly, publication in the digital age can involve complexities beyond traditional media. A single tweet or Facebook post can quickly reach a wide audience, magnifying reputational harm. Liability attaches even if the defendant did not intend for extensive circulation; once the statement is accessible to others, it is “published.” Certain nuances, such as accidental publication or intermediary platforms (like ISPs), may introduce additional defences or immunities, but these often require specialized legal arguments. Generally, if the plaintiff can show that at least one person besides themselves received and understood the defamatory expression, the publication element is satisfied. Any disclaimers by the defendant about “not meaning to publish” rarely negate the fact that publication occurred.

DEFENDING AGAINST A DEFAMATION CLAIM

A lot of people incorrectly believe that it’s hard to “prove” defamation. In fact, the threshold for making out a defamation claim is pretty low: a communication to a 3rd party about the plaintiff that tends to lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of a reasonable person. The battle in defamation claims comes down to the defences. Ontario law accommodates multiple defences that can shield defendants from liability even if the plaintiff proves a prima facie case. Each defence mirrors an aspect of public policy: preserving open discussion, encouraging truthful reporting, or upholding societal duties. Below is an overview of the most common defences.

(a). Absolute Privilege

Absolute privilege offers absolute protection against defamation in a narrow class of situations where free and unfettered communication is considered to be of vital importance. These occasions constitute an absolute defence to any defamation claim. Common contexts include parliamentary debates, judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and certain high-level executive functions. The hallmark of absolute privilege is that it applies even if the speaker acted maliciously or knowingly disseminated falsehoods. For example, statements made on the floor of the Ontario Legislative Assembly enjoy full protection, ensuring members speak without fear of civil liability for defamation. A similar immunity extends to participants (judges, lawyers, witnesses) in judicial settings, enabling them to comment on evidence or argue positions candidly. Courts reason that although this broad immunity might sometimes protect unscrupulous statements, the greater public good lies in safeguarding frank discourse in these important settings. Nonetheless, absolute privilege is carefully limited to recognized official contexts. A witness repeating the same allegations outside the courtroom or a politician defaming a private citizen in a press release typically lose absolute privilege. Its absolute nature in the enumerated scenarios is justified by the overriding need for complete candour in those specific areas of governance and adjudication.

(b). Qualified Privilege

Qualified privilege provides protection in a way similar to absolute privilege, but the privilege is “qualified” because it can be lost. Qualified privilege arises when the defendant has a moral, social, or legal duty to communicate information to someone who shares a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. Classic examples include reference letters for employees, workplace incident reports, or communications among shareholders regarding a company’s affairs. The law wants to encourage candid sharing of relevant facts without fear of defamation suits, as long as the speaker acts honestly and without malice. Malice is the pivotal factor that can undermine qualified privilege. If the defendant spreads harmful statements out of spite, personal vengeance, or reckless disregard for the truth, the defence evaporates. Courts look for evidence that the defendant distorted facts or harboured ill-will unrelated to the legitimate purpose of the communication. Qualified privilege thus stands or falls on the speaker’s good faith. When it is upheld, it provides a complete defence, enabling people to speak freely in contexts where openness is vital. Once malice is proven, however, the privileged shield collapses.

(c). Justification (Truth)

Justification, commonly known as the truth defence, holds that an otherwise defamatory statement cannot result in liability if it is substantially true. This defence underscores the fundamental principle that defamation law aims to shield individuals from false attacks, not from accurate—albeit harmful—information. If the defendant demonstrates the essential veracity of the allegations, the plaintiff’s claim fails outright. In practice, the defendant must prove the key elements or “sting” of the statement are correct. Minor inaccuracies will not necessarily defeat justification if the central allegations remain substantially true. For instance, if a defendant claims the plaintiff embezzled $100,000 but the proven sum is $95,000, the variance might be insignificant. Conversely, if the allegations are wildly off-mark, or if the defendant’s primary assertion lacks evidentiary support, the defence falls short. Successful reliance on truth often demands thorough investigative records, robust witness testimony, or relevant documentation. The legal burden is on the defendant to establish the factual truth, which can be challenging if evidence is elusive or the events in question are complex. Nonetheless, once the court finds the material aspects of the statement are accurate, the plaintiff cannot prevail in a defamation action.

(d). Responsible Communication

The responsible communication defence is a modern legal doctrine crafted to protect individuals—often journalists or commentators—who publish on matters of public interest after conducting due diligence. While it is closely tied to media reports, community activists, bloggers, and other public communicators may also invoke it. The essential notion is that the law should not penalize someone who researches a topic responsibly, seeks relevant input (including the subject’s perspective), and fairly presents a story—even if some details turn out to be incorrect. Several factors guide the court’s evaluation of “responsible” conduct: the importance and urgency of the matter, the reliability of sources, efforts made to verify information, the prominence given to any allegations, and whether the publisher promptly addressed inaccuracies. This framework, rooted in the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach, recognizes that absolute certainty can be difficult to achieve, particularly in fast-moving or investigative contexts. Provided the defendant’s methods align with the standard of responsible newsgathering or commentary, they may avoid liability for unintentional factual errors. At its core, this defence preserves a free, robust exchange of ideas on issues that concern the public, without imposing an impossible standard of absolute accuracy in every detail.

(e). Reports Privileged by Statute

Certain legislative acts confer statutory privilege for reports on official proceedings or documents, thereby shielding accurate accounts from defamation claims. Parliament and provincial legislatures have deemed it in the public interest that citizens have unfettered access to reports of legislative debates, municipal meetings, judicial proceedings, or quasi-judicial inquiries. If the publication contains a fair and accurate summary of these official documents or proceedings, the defendant can invoke statutory privilege to defeat a defamation claim. However, statutory privilege generally hinges on meeting specified conditions. For instance, the report must not deviate materially from the actual record; it should not distort or misrepresent what transpired or was said. Some statutes also impose obligations, such as a requirement that the defendant issue a retraction if mistakes are discovered, or clarify any partial quotes. If the publisher meets these criteria, the public interest in widespread, unimpeded reporting takes precedence over an individual’s reputational concerns. This defence’s rationale echoes broader democratic values: citizens can evaluate governmental or regulatory processes best when accurate information is widely disseminated.

(f). Fair Comment

Fair comment protects opinion-based statements about matters of public interest. Unlike justification, which focuses on proving factual truth, fair comment applies to expressions of subjective judgment, criticism, or commentary, provided that (1) the comment is on a matter of public interest, (2) it is based on true or widely known facts (or privileged statements), (3) it can be recognized as an opinion rather than a statement of fact, and (4) it is made honestly, without malice. The defence allows critics, journalists, and everyday citizens to voice strong, even hyperbolic, opinions on issues like politics, art, and social policy. Courts consider whether a person could reasonably hold the view, given the facts. If so, the comment may be protected, even if it is extremely unfavorable or unpopular. Evidence of malice (a hidden or vindictive motive) can nullify this defence, because defamation law draws a line between genuine expression of viewpoint and malicious attempts to harm another’s reputation. By endorsing the fair comment doctrine, Ontario’s legal framework recognizes the need to foster healthy public discourse, especially regarding topics that affect the broader community.
Consent invalidates a defamation claim by establishing that the plaintiff either explicitly or implicitly agreed to the communication of the alleged defamatory statements. If the plaintiff willingly permitted the defendant to publish, broadcast, or circulate these remarks, they cannot later claim harm from what they essentially authorized. Written or contractual authorizations are the clearest form of consent, but implied consent can also arise, for example, when someone agrees to an interview or a news feature and knowingly provides negative details about themselves. Nonetheless, consent is confined to the scope of what the plaintiff intended to allow. If the defendant exceeds that scope—by adding unapproved content, distorting the statement, or disseminating it far more broadly than agreed—the defence may not apply. A court will review whether the plaintiff truly understood the nature of the publication and if they genuinely accepted the risk of potential reputational damage. Consent obtained through coercion or misrepresentation is also invalid. When legitimate consent is proven, liability disappears because defamation law protects individuals from unconsented reputational injuries. No wrongdoing exists if the plaintiff consciously sanctioned the very publication they later denounce.

(h). Timeline for Notice Requirements

Ontario’s defamation legislation imposes notice requirements and tight limitation periods, particularly for actions involving news media (like newspapers or broadcasts). Plaintiffs typically must provide a timely written notice to the publisher or broadcaster before commencing a defamation lawsuit, often within a few weeks or months of first learning about the defamation. This procedural step serves multiple objectives: alerting the defendant, permitting them to offer retractions or corrections, and potentially reducing the scope of litigation if the defendant immediately remedies the harm.

Furthermore, the limitation period for filing a defamation claim is generally shorter than in other civil matters. Plaintiffs who miss these statutory deadlines risk having their actions barred. Conversely, prompt notice and swift initiation of a lawsuit protect the integrity of evidence and allow more efficient dispute resolution. Courts tend to enforce these timelines firmly, emphasizing the policy that defamation disputes should be resolved while the context and statements remain fresh in everyone’s memory. For both plaintiffs and defendants, awareness of applicable deadlines can prove decisive in shaping the course and outcome of a defamation case.

DAMAGES IN DEFAMATION CASES

Damages in libel focus on compensation for reputational loss, consolation for distress, and vindication, and the right mix varies case-to-case; past awards are a poor guide because assessments turn on specific facts. In libel, general damages are presumed without proof of actual loss; slander typically requires proof unless it falls within slander-per-se categories or a statute removes that requirement. Courts look at the seriousness of the allegation, with graver accusations tending to justify higher awards, and the mode and extent of publication (including the Internet’s “worldwide ubiquity,” the tendency of harmful content to spread or “percolate,” and whether there were repeated publications). They also weigh the plaintiff’s standing in the community, the importance of reputation to the plaintiff’s work or profession (often an aggravating factor for professionals), and intangible impacts such as injured feelings and psychological harm. Evidence that the words were actually believed – for example, inquiries by regulators, lost credit, or changed business relations – can increase damages even where publication was not massive. A reasoned court judgment offers some vindication, but usually has only marginal effect on quantum.

APOLOGIES AND RETRACTIONS

Apologies and retractions can materially reduce exposure in a defamation dispute when they are prompt, unequivocal, and publicized to the same audience with comparable prominence to the original publication. Courts consider them on damages (they cannot order one), and give little weight to efforts that are hedged, “lame and late,” or made on the eve of trial. Under Ontario’s Apology Act, an apology is not an admission of liability and does not void insurance or count toward fault determinations, yet the wording should still be careful and direct. In newspaper and broadcast libel, Ontario’s Libel and Slander Act can, in prescribed conditions (good faith, no criminal charge, mistake), restrict recovery to actual/special damages if a full and fair retraction is issued promptly and as conspicuously as the original; “headline” libel calls for a headline-level retraction, and a statement that the publisher is merely “not aware of evidence” is inadequate (the error should be stated plainly). Even so, an apology cannot always undo the harm; the practical value lies in speed, prominence, and clarity.

INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FURTHER PUBLICATION

Injunctions in defamation cases are an equitable tool that can stop continued or repeated publication of defamatory material. Ontario courts traditionally hesitate to issue injunctions prematurely, as blocking speech can encroach on fundamental freedom of expression rights before liability is conclusively determined. Yet when the plaintiff provides strong evidence that the statements are clearly defamatory, that there are no valid defences, and that irreparable harm looms, the court may grant an interlocutory injunction. Post-trial, once the defendant’s liability is established, a permanent injunction can prevent renewed circulation of the same false statements. Such rulings often arise in cases where the defendant is obstinately repeating the defamatory remarks, jeopardizing the plaintiff’s efforts to move on. The remedy underscores that once a court has deemed a statement libellous and lacking defence, preserving its continuing circulation serves no legitimate interest. Although injunctions are not guaranteed, they remain a powerful strategy when monetary compensation alone seems insufficient to protect reputational integrity—especially in an era where online posts can remain accessible indefinitely.

ONTARIO'S ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION

Ontario’s anti-SLAPP provisions, embedded in s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, address “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” These are lawsuits often filed to silence or intimidate individuals or groups who speak out on matters of public interest—such as environmental concerns, political debates, or social activism. The legislation allows courts to dismiss such cases early if the defendant proves (1) the expression relates to a public interest issue, and (2) the claim lacks substantial merit or causes an undue chill on free debate. Once a defendant raises the anti-SLAPP motion, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that their claim has real merit and that the harm caused by the alleged defamation is significant enough to override the public interest in free expression. If they fail, the court can terminate the lawsuit, potentially awarding costs and damages to the defendant for undue hardship. By allowing quick dismissal of groundless suits, the anti-SLAPP framework preserves open discussion of civic affairs while maintaining recourse for legitimate defamation complaints. Plaintiffs with genuinely meritorious claims can still proceed, but they must demonstrate a legitimate basis, preventing misuse of defamation as a cudgel to stifle debate.

SLANDER

Slander generally refers to defamatory statements expressed orally or through other transient forms, as opposed to libel, which typically involves written or more permanent media. However, Canadian law often treats slander and libel similarly, with both requiring proof of a false statement, a defamatory meaning, a reference to the plaintiff, and publication to a third party. Where they differ is that slander often necessitates proof of actual damages—monetary or otherwise—unless it meets certain established exceptions known as “slander per se.”

Slander Per Se

In slander per se cases, the law presumes damages, just as it does for libel, so the plaintiff need not prove a specific loss. Common categories of slander per se include:

Allegations of a Crime: Accusing someone of a criminal offence.
Imputations of Loathsome Disease: Claiming they suffer from a contagious or “shameful” illness.

Attacks on Professional or Business Reputation: Stating they are unfit or incompetent to carry on their vocation.

Imputations of Unchastity or Serious Moral Failing (Historically): Albeit used less often in modern contexts, it remains recognized in case law.
The rationale is that these sorts of allegations are so inherently harmful that the plaintiff’s reputation is presumed to suffer. Consequently, even if the statement was uttered briefly or to a small audience, the law spares the plaintiff from the burden of proving tangible damage. At the same time, defendants who raise recognized defences—such as truth or qualified privilege—can still escape liability despite the presumption of harm. If none of those defences apply, a finding of slander per se entitles the plaintiff to at least nominal damages, with the potential for aggravated or punitive damages depending on the circumstances.

Common Questions

F.A.Q.

Disclaimer: The answers provided in this FAQ section are general in nature and should not be relied upon as formal legal advice. Each individual case is unique, and a separate analysis is required to address specific context and fact situations. For comprehensive guidance tailored to your situation, we welcome you to contact our expert team.

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