Primary Market Disclosure & Prospectus Claims
Prospectus misrepresentation, offering memoranda liability, and circular disputes. We prosecute and defend rescission and damages claims arising from primary offerings.
Read moreCapital Markets
Grigoras Law represents investors, issuers, directors, and market intermediaries in securities disputes across Ontario. We act on both sides of the "v." in matters involving primary and secondary market misrepresentation, continuous disclosure issues, registration and advisory conduct, fund management disputes, and governance failures that spill into securities liability.

What We Do
Prospectus misrepresentation, offering memoranda liability, and circular disputes. We prosecute and defend rescission and damages claims arising from primary offerings.
Read moreLeave motions, certification defence, and liability cap arguments. We defend issuers, directors, and officers in statutory secondary market claims.
Read moreCivil liability for trading on MNPI, tipping claims, and defences. We handle accountability actions and establish necessary course of business defences.
Read moreCertification criteria, common issues, and preferable procedure arguments. We navigate leave requirements and prevent strike suits.
Read moreHedley Byrne principles, fraud claims, and fiduciary duty breaches. We pursue and defend common law torts running alongside statutory claims.
Read morePrice comparison models, event studies, and proportionate trading analysis. We coordinate financial experts and challenge opposing damages theories.
Read moreReasonable investigation processes, cautionary language requirements, and public knowledge defences. We build documentary records that withstand scrutiny.
Read moreParallel proceedings strategy, regulatory findings admissibility, and global settlement coordination. We manage dual-track exposure.
Read moreNI 52-109 compliance, audit committee practices, and documentation strategies. We advise on preventive governance and litigation readiness.
Read moreYour Legal Team

Counsel — Civil & Appellate Litigation

Counsel — Civil & Appellate Litigation
Representative Work
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Investor claim under the Securities Act and common law
Counsel to an individual investor pursuing recovery after entrusting significant capital to a purported investment adviser and related entities. The claim alleges unregistered trading and advising in securities, illegal distribution of investment products, misrepresentations about risk and security of the investment, and misappropriation of funds within a pooled structure. Relief sought includes rescission and damages under securities legislation, together with equitable remedies such as tracing, disgorgement of profits, and ancillary common law claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and deceit.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Statutory civil liability, misrepresentation, and related corporate remedies
Counsel to a private corporate investor in a dispute over capital advanced under a series of investment and loan arrangements. The action alleges that the defendants raised money through securities that were distributed without proper registration or available exemptions, and that key facts about the use of proceeds, existing indebtedness, and financial condition were misrepresented or withheld. Claims include statutory and common law misrepresentation, breach of contract and trust, securities law violations in connection with the distribution and promotion of the investments, and related corporate remedies aimed at recovering the invested funds and addressing alleged diversion of assets.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Defence of issuer and director against fraud and Securities Act allegations
Counsel to an issuer and a senior principal defending an investor claim arising from a series of investment products marketed through affiliated financial services entities. The plaintiff alleges that securities were promoted as secure or low-risk when the businesses were already under financial strain, that new investor funds were used to satisfy prior obligations, and that the defendants failed to comply with registration and distribution requirements under provincial securities legislation. The claim seeks wide-ranging relief including Mareva and tracing orders, rescission, and substantial damages. Our mandate includes resisting extraordinary pre-judgment remedies, contesting the alleged securities law breaches, and managing the interplay with parallel regulatory investigations.
Insights & Analysis
Securities Misconduct & Enforcement
Disclosure, Misrepresentation & Investor Remedies
Modern securities law in Canada assumes that robust, accurate disclosure allows investors to assess risk and allocate capital rationally. When disclosure breaks down — through misrepresentation in a prospectus, continuous disclosure failure, or insider trading — the law provides both regulatory and civil tools to restore confidence and compensate those who have suffered losses. Ontario's system distinguishes between public enforcement by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) through administrative and quasi-criminal proceedings, and private enforcement where investors seek redress in the civil courts. The same underlying conduct can trigger both — and the civil side rests heavily on the statutory civil liability provisions in the Securities Act (Ontario), which supplement and in many respects improve upon traditional common law claims.
Securities litigation in Ontario sits at the intersection of capital markets, investor protection, and corporate governance. In practice, disputes often involve public issuers whose securities trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange or other Canadian marketplaces, but the same principles apply to exempt-market offerings, investment funds, and complex financing structures. Issuers, underwriters, directors, officers, investment dealers, portfolio managers, and other gatekeepers may all face exposure when disclosure is alleged to be false or incomplete. Investors may sue individually, but the regime is designed with class proceedings in mind, recognizing that many investors suffer similar harm when misrepresentations affect market price.
Canadian securities legislation creates a framework of statutory civil liability (SCL) that applies in defined situations: misrepresentation in a prospectus, offering memorandum, or certain circulars; trading or tipping while in possession of material non-public information; and misrepresentation in continuous disclosure or other public statements in the secondary market. The central concept is the statutory definition of "misrepresentation" — which captures both an untrue statement of a material fact and an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the circumstances. A material fact is one that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of the securities.
Misrepresentation in a prospectus, offering memorandum, or circular used in connection with a distribution or transaction requiring securityholder approval — investors are given statutory rights of rescission or damages without proving individual reliance on specific statements.
Misrepresentation in continuous disclosure documents (annual reports, MDA, press releases) or public oral statements, or failure to make timely disclosure of a material change — any person who acquired or disposed of securities during the misrepresentation period has standing, without proving individual reliance.
Trading or recommending trades while in possession of material non-public information — those on the other side of the trade may bring civil accountability actions, and the issuer itself may sue to recover profits made or losses avoided by the insider.
At common law, an investor alleging negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation must demonstrate: a duty of care; an untrue, inaccurate, or incomplete material statement; actual individual reliance on it; and causation of loss. Those requirements are extremely difficult to satisfy in a public markets context, where investors trade based on a mix of disclosure documents, analyst commentary, index inclusion, and market signals — many not traceable to a particular statement or moment in time. The statutory SCL regime responds by relaxing the reliance burden on investors and substituting a structured set of presumptions, defences, and damage limits. Statutory civil liability does not, however, displace common law misrepresentation. Plaintiffs routinely plead both statutory and common law causes of action arising from the same disclosure events, using the statutory route for its presumptions about reliance and the common law route where the fact pattern supports additional heads of damages or where the statutory provisions do not apply.
Primary market statutory civil liability deals with the distribution of securities to the public through prospectuses, offering memoranda, and circulars used in connection with transactions requiring securityholder approval. These provisions reflect the policy that investors making initial investment decisions should receive complete and accurate information.
| Document Type | When Liability Arises | Who May Be Liable | Remedies Available |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prospectus | Misrepresentation in a filed prospectus during the distribution period | Issuer, every director at time of filing, certain officers, underwriters, experts whose reports are included | Rescission or damages; reliance may be presumed for purchasers acquiring under the prospectus |
| Offering Memorandum | Misrepresentation in an OM used for exempt-market offerings | Issuer and typically its principals; scope varies by provincial statute | Similar to prospectus — rescission or damages; often combined with common law negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims |
| Circular (Takeover / Issuer Bid / Arrangement) | Misrepresentation in a circular issued in connection with a transaction requiring securityholder approval or tender decision | Issuer, directors, and in some cases financial advisors or experts whose opinions are incorporated | Damages; rescission in limited circumstances; frequently combined with fiduciary duty and oppression claims |
When an issuer conducts a public offering, it must file and deliver a prospectus that discloses all material facts relating to the securities being offered. If that prospectus contains a misrepresentation, purchasers who acquired securities under the document during the distribution period have a statutory right of action for rescission or damages. Rescission effectively unwinds the transaction — the investor returns the securities in exchange for the original purchase price. Damages compensate for the difference between the price paid and the value the securities would have had if the prospectus had been accurate. The legislation recognizes that investors in public offerings rely on the integrity of the disclosure system as a whole; if a material misrepresentation is established, reliance may be presumed for qualifying purchasers, subject to the statutory defences available to each defendant.
Offering memoranda are used in many exempt-market offerings when securities are sold without a full prospectus. Even though these offerings target narrower groups — often accredited investors or those with specific connections to the issuer — the legislation extends statutory civil liability to misrepresentations in an OM. The investor pool is usually smaller and more concentrated, which shapes whether claims proceed individually or via class proceedings. In practice, civil claims in this space commonly combine statutory OM misrepresentation provisions with common law theories such as negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary duty.
Statutory civil liability extends to misrepresentations in circulars used in connection with take-over bids, issuer bids, arrangements, and other corporate transactions requiring securityholder approval. If those circulars contain a misrepresentation, any securityholder who receives the document may have standing to sue. Litigation over circular misrepresentation often turns on questions of materiality, conflicts of interest, and the adequacy of fairness opinions or other expert reports. Courts must balance the need for fulsome disclosure against the practical reality that complex transactions cannot be reduced to a few simple sentences — the test remains whether omitted or inaccurate information would reasonably be expected to affect a securityholder's decision to vote or tender. These cases frequently overlap with fiduciary duty and oppression claims, especially when control transactions are perceived to favour insiders at the expense of minority securityholders.
The introduction of secondary market statutory civil liability was one of the most significant developments in Canadian securities litigation. Historically, open-market investors who bought or sold shares faced serious hurdles — at common law, each investor generally had to prove they actually read and relied on specific impugned statements, an unrealistic expectation in a liquid market. The secondary market SCL provisions create a statutory right of action against "responsible issuers," certain influential persons, and those with authority to speak on their behalf, where a public document or public oral statement contains a misrepresentation, or where there has been a failure to make timely disclosure of a material change.
Any person who acquired or disposed of the issuer's securities during the period between the misrepresentation and its public correction has standing to sue — without needing to prove individual reliance on the impugned disclosure. This eliminates the single greatest practical obstacle to open-market investor claims, which is why secondary market SCL actions are almost invariably brought as class proceedings and why the legislature introduced the leave requirement and liability caps as balancing measures.
Plaintiffs must obtain leave of the court before they can proceed, and the court must be satisfied that the action is brought in good faith and has a reasonable possibility of success. This threshold is more than a speed bump — judges must undertake a reasoned consideration of the evidence to ensure that the case has some merit, while stopping short of conducting a mini-trial. Secondary market cases are almost always brought as class proceedings. To obtain certification, plaintiffs must satisfy the usual class action criteria: an identifiable class, common issues, and the preferable procedure requirement. In Ontario, amendments to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 have raised the bar by requiring that a class proceeding be superior to other reasonably available means of resolving the dispute and that common issues predominate over individual ones.
The Acts impose liability caps and detailed defences, recognizing that open-market issuers face a constant stream of disclosure decisions and that exposure to uncapped damages could deter companies from listing or from making legitimate forward-looking statements. Liability is generally proportionate to each defendant's responsibility. There are specific defences for forward-looking information identified as such and accompanied by appropriate cautionary language. Courts assessing these defences look closely at the processes used to verify information, the involvement of experts, the role of audit committees, and how quickly issuers responded once problems were discovered.
Despite the breadth of statutory civil liability, common law causes of action continue to play a significant role in securities litigation. Plaintiffs frequently advance both statutory and common law claims in the same proceeding — using statutory schemes for reliance presumptions and using common law theories to seek fuller recovery or to address fact patterns the statutory provisions do not capture.
Requires a false material statement, negligence in making it, actual reliance, and causation of loss. Valuable in private placements, investment advice, and bespoke financing arrangements — harder to prove on a class-wide basis in open-market secondary cases.
An intentional tort — statement made with knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to truth, with intent the plaintiff rely. Negates insurance and indemnity protection for defendants. Higher proof burden, but no caps on recoverable damages.
Officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation — actionable by the company or through a derivative action. Direct fiduciary duty to securityholders is rare; requires special circumstances of vulnerability, dependency, or discretionary power.
Common law misrepresentation claims require the plaintiff to prove that a false statement was made, that it was material, that the defendant was at least negligent in making it, that the plaintiff relied on it, and that the reliance caused the claimed losses. In individual suits — claims involving private placements, investment advice, or bespoke financing arrangements — these elements can often be established with direct evidence. In large secondary market cases, individual reliance and causation can be much harder to prove on a class-wide basis, which was one of the key drivers behind the creation of the secondary market statutory regime. One reason plaintiffs continue to invoke common law theories alongside statutory claims is that statutory schemes may cap damages or limit liability for certain actors, encouraging plaintiffs to seek fuller recovery where the facts support it.
Deceit is an intentional tort and places a more substantial burden of proof on the plaintiff — but where deceit or fraud is intentional, any insurance or indemnity protection otherwise afforded to the defendant is negated. To establish deceit, the plaintiff must prove: an untrue statement of material fact or an intentional omission making a statement misleading overall; that the misstatement or omission was material; that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to truth; that the defendant intended reliance; and that the plaintiff actually relied and suffered loss as a result. The intentional nature of the tort means that successful fraud claims against directors or officers will not be covered by D&O insurance, significantly increasing the practical consequences of liability.
Officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, which may be asserted by the company or through a derivative action on behalf of the company. An officer or director is unlikely to be held to owe a securityholder a fiduciary duty directly, unless special circumstances exist with respect to vulnerability, dependency, or discretionary power — particularly in closely held companies. Once a fiduciary duty is established, the plaintiff must show that the defendant breached the standard of care required of an officer or director. Courts recognize that decision-making is an essential role of directors; a director is expected to act as a reasonably prudent person would in the circumstances, is not liable for errors in judgment, and is justified in trusting officers and relying on information received from inquiries. Failure typically stems from failure to inquire — a diligent director who made reasonable inquiry will not be liable.
Statutory civil liability extends to insider trading and tipping — trading or recommending trades while in possession of material non-public information (MNPI). Canadian statutes treat this conduct as a serious breach of market integrity because it allows informed insiders to profit at the expense of uninformed market participants.
| Conduct | Who May Be Liable | Civil Remedy | Key Defence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insider Trading | Any person in a special relationship with a reporting issuer who trades on undisclosed MNPI | Damages to the purchaser or seller on the other side of the trade; accountability action by the issuer to recover profit made or loss avoided | MNPI was actually generally disclosed; plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material fact at time of transaction |
| Tipping | The reporting issuer, a person in a special relationship with the issuer, or a person proposing a substantial acquisition who informs another of undisclosed MNPI | Damages to persons who traded at a disadvantage; tippee liability can follow if tippee trades | Disclosure was necessary (not merely ordinary) in the course of business; necessary for a take-over bid, business combination, or substantial acquisition |
| Accountability Action | Insider, affiliate, or associate who traded or tipped while in possession of MNPI | Issuer sues to recover profit made or loss avoided — if issuer fails to act, securities commission or securityholder may seek court leave to pursue in the issuer's name | Court must be satisfied the action is in the best interests of the issuer and securityholders, balancing anticipated costs against likely benefits |
The defendant in an insider trading action is liable to compensate the purchaser or seller of the securities for damages resulting from the trade. In an accountability action, the issuer can sue an insider, affiliate, or associate who has traded or tipped while in possession of MNPI, seeking to recover the profit made or the loss avoided. If the issuer fails to act, legislation allows the securities commission or a securityholder to ask the court for permission to pursue the claim in the issuer's name — the court must be satisfied that the action is in the best interests of the issuer and its securityholders, balancing anticipated costs against the likely benefits of recovery.
Liability will not be found where the defendant proves they reasonably believed the material fact or material change had been generally disclosed, or that the material fact or material change at issue was known or ought reasonably to have been known by the plaintiff at the time of the transaction. Where information was disclosed in the necessary — and not merely ordinary — course of business, the tipper will not be liable for damages. With respect to tipping in the context of take-over bids, business combinations, or substantial acquisitions, the accused will not be liable where the disclosure was necessary to effect the respective transaction.
Securities class actions have become a prominent feature of the Canadian litigation landscape. All provinces have legislation that can be used to bring class proceedings, and courts in Ontario, British Columbia, Québec, Alberta, and Prince Edward Island have developed detailed jurisprudence on when securities cases should be certified and how to manage them efficiently.
Certification is a procedural gateway — not a judgment on the merits — designed to determine whether a class action is a fair and efficient way of resolving common issues compared to multiple individual suits. Judges consider whether there is an identifiable class, whether common issues predominate, whether a class proceeding is the preferable procedure, and whether there is an appropriate representative plaintiff. In securities cases, the common issues often focus on the existence of a misrepresentation, the materiality of omitted information, the timing and adequacy of corrective disclosure, and the role of each defendant. Where common law negligent misrepresentation claims are advanced alongside statutory ones, courts wrestle with whether reliance issues can be addressed efficiently — and in some instances have declined to certify common law claims while allowing statutory SCL claims to proceed.
The most significant hurdle in Canadian securities class actions has historically been the reliance requirement. To establish reliance on an individual basis — as required by secondary market participants for negligent misrepresentation claims — essentially undermines the commonality requirement of certification, making the claims unsuitable for class actions. United States common law has developed the "fraud on the market" theory to overcome this: a cause of action for securities violations that does not require litigants to prove individual reliance, premised on the idea that in efficient markets, prices incorporate public information and investors who trade at the market price implicitly rely on the integrity of that price. Canadian courts have carefully considered whether to adopt this theory, recognizing that the procedural restrictions and certification requirements in Canada differ from those in the United States. The secondary market SCL provisions largely obviate the need for this theory by dispensing with individual reliance requirements for statutory claims.
Before reaching the certification stage, plaintiffs in securities class actions must obtain leave of the court — introduced as a method of preventing "strike suits," claims brought with little merit designed to extract settlement payments from defendants who wish to avoid the costs of protracted litigation. Leave will be granted where the plaintiff establishes through affidavit evidence that the action is brought in good faith and that the class has a reasonable possibility of success against the defendant. All class action settlements must be approved by the court, and securities class actions must also gain judicial approval to discontinue — both requirements deter strike suits and ensure settlements are fair and reasonable to all class members.
Calculated by comparing the price at which class members bought or sold during the misrepresentation period with the price that would likely have prevailed had the truth been known — economists perform event studies to isolate the portion of price movement attributable to the misrepresentation versus general market factors.
Unwinds the transaction entirely — the investor returns the securities in exchange for the original purchase price. Available even for innocent misrepresentation in prospectus and OM claims; must typically be sought within tight time frames measured from the date of purchase.
In exceptional cases, courts may impose constructive trusts or grant other equitable remedies where damages alone are insufficient — particularly in insider trading and fiduciary duty cases where tracing principles support proprietary relief over specific identifiable assets.
Damages in securities class actions are typically calculated by comparing the price at which class members bought or sold securities during the misrepresentation period with the price that would likely have prevailed had the truth been known. Economists may perform event studies to isolate the portion of price movement attributable to the misrepresentation as opposed to general market or industry factors. This can be an intricate exercise — models such as proportionate trading approaches have been discussed to estimate how many securities were held by class members at different points in time, although courts remain cautious about complex methodologies that may be difficult to prove at trial or explain to a jury.
For primary market claims, rescission may be available even where there is an innocent misrepresentation, whereas damages will only be successfully sought where the plaintiff can show that the misrepresentation was material at the time of the contract. Rescission effectively places parties back in their pre-contract positions, unwinding the transaction — this remedy must typically be sought within tight time frames measured from the date of purchase. In exceptional cases, courts may impose constructive trusts or grant other equitable remedies where damages alone would be insufficient to address the wrong or where tracing principles support proprietary relief.
Limitation periods for statutory claims involving a prospectus, offering memorandum, circular, or insider trading typically feature two distinct periods: one tied to rescission and another to damages. Investors seeking rescission usually must act within a relatively short period, often measured in months from the date of the transaction. Actions for damages can usually be brought within the earlier of a fixed number of years from the transaction and a shorter period after the investor first had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action. For secondary market claims, the legislation links the limitation period to the date of the impugned conduct and to a subsequent news release disclosing that leave to commence a secondary market action has been obtained — reflecting a policy choice about fairness and finality that is distinct from the primary market regime.
| Defence | When It Applies | What Must Be Shown |
|---|---|---|
| Reasonable Investigation / Due Diligence | Primary and secondary market claims; regulatory proceedings | Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds to believe the disclosure was accurate — courts look closely at processes, expert involvement, audit committee oversight, and how quickly problems were addressed once discovered |
| Forward-Looking Information Safe Harbour | Secondary market SCL; continuous disclosure | Statement was clearly identified as forward-looking; accompanied by meaningful cautionary language about factors that could cause actual results to differ materially |
| Public Knowledge / Plaintiff Knew | All SCL claims | Plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known of the misrepresentation at the time of the transaction — or a timely, clear, and sufficiently disseminated public correction was made |
| MNPI Generally Disclosed (Insider Trading) | Insider trading and tipping claims | Defendant reasonably believed the material fact or material change had been generally disclosed before the impugned trade or tip |
| Necessary Course of Business (Tipping) | Tipping claims | Disclosure was necessary — not merely ordinary — in the course of business, or was necessary to effect a take-over bid, business combination, or substantial acquisition |
Courts assessing due diligence defences look closely at the processes used to verify information, the involvement of experts, the role of audit committees, and whether documentation supports the conclusion that the issuer took disclosure obligations seriously. Robust governance structures and a culture of compliance do not guarantee immunity from litigation, but they can significantly strengthen the defence position and may persuade courts that any misstatements were inadvertent and promptly corrected. The legislation also provides for proportionate liability between multiple defendants, reflecting a policy choice to encourage rigorous disclosure processes without exposing all participants to unlimited and unpredictable damages.
The forward-looking information safe harbour recognizes that companies must be able to discuss future plans, projections, and estimates without fear that every forecast that does not materialize will trigger liability. The legislation strikes a balance by requiring that forward-looking statements be clearly identified and accompanied by meaningful cautions about the factors that could cause actual results to differ. Generic boilerplate cautionary language that does not address the specific risks relevant to the forecast in question will not satisfy this defence — courts look for specific, tailored disclosure that genuinely alerts investors to the material uncertainties behind the projections.
Defendants may avoid liability where they can prove the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known of the misrepresentation at the time of the transaction, or where a timely public correction was made. Courts examine whether corrective disclosure was sufficiently clear, prominent, and disseminated through appropriate channels to reach the market effectively — a buried footnote in a quarterly filing will not qualify as an effective correction of a headline misrepresentation made in a press release or investor presentation.
Investors and issuers operate in an environment where regulatory enforcement is never far in the background. The OSC investigates suspected misconduct, holds administrative hearings, and can impose sanctions ranging from cease-trade orders and director-officer bans to significant monetary penalties. Breaches of securities law can also give rise to quasi-criminal or criminal charges in more serious cases. Administrative, civil, and quasi-criminal responses are complementary, not mutually exclusive — a single course of conduct can trigger OSC investigations, settlement discussions, and parallel or follow-on civil suits by investors.
From a litigation standpoint, enforcement activity has several important effects. Regulatory investigations generate documentary records, witness interviews, and expert analyses that often become relevant in civil proceedings. Where settlement agreements or reasons for decision are made public, plaintiffs may draw on regulators' findings to support their claims — though courts retain an independent role in assessing evidence and will not simply adopt regulators' conclusions wholesale. Evidence of regulatory findings may be admissible but not determinative, especially where settlements are negotiated on a no-contest basis. The standards of proof and policy objectives in enforcement proceedings differ from those in civil actions: litigation primarily aims to compensate investors for losses caused by wrongs, while regulatory enforcement focuses on deterrence, market integrity, and the public interest.
The existence of administrative penalties or sanctions can influence settlement dynamics in civil suits. Issuers and directors may be more inclined to resolve investor claims after addressing regulatory risk, or they may seek to coordinate global settlements that cover both regulatory and private actions. This coordination can be complex — confidentiality obligations, admissions, and the allocation of settlement funds must be carefully negotiated to avoid prejudicing one proceeding while resolving another. Courts carefully scrutinize securities class action settlements and litigation funding arrangements to ensure they are fair and reasonable to all class members and do not create undue conflicts of interest.
Securities litigation is highly fact-specific, but several recurring themes emerge from the Canadian jurisprudence. For issuers and their boards, one central lesson is that process matters — courts assessing defences such as due diligence, reasonable investigation, and forward-looking information protections look closely at how disclosure decisions were made, not just what was ultimately disclosed.
Courts ask whether audit committees met regularly, whether management engaged qualified experts, whether concerns were raised and properly addressed, and whether documentation supports the conclusion that the issuer took disclosure obligations seriously. Boards should ensure that disclosure controls and procedures are documented, tested, and reviewed regularly. Management certifications under National Instrument 52-109 serve as one tool in this process, but they cannot substitute for genuine oversight and engagement with disclosure quality.
Audit committees meeting regularly and maintaining detailed minutes of disclosure review discussions; independent legal counsel engaged whenever disclosure decisions involve judgment calls on materiality; prompt corrective action with clear, specific language when errors are discovered; documented escalation procedures for material change decisions; and robust disclosure controls tested at least annually. These practices do not guarantee immunity, but they create a contemporaneous record that demonstrates good faith and reasonable process — the evidentiary foundation of the due diligence defence.
For investors contemplating litigation, the regime offers a range of strategic choices: whether to proceed individually or as part of a class; whether to rely primarily on statutory civil liability or to add common law and contractual claims; and how to coordinate with parallel regulatory processes or foreign proceedings where the issuer has cross-border listings. Securities class actions may involve third-party litigation funding and cost-sharing arrangements, especially in jurisdictions where unsuccessful plaintiffs are exposed to adverse costs awards. Courts carefully scrutinize these arrangements to ensure they do not create undue conflicts of interest and remain consistent with access to justice principles.
Secondary market civil liability raises complex jurisdictional questions in an era of globally integrated capital markets. Investors resident in one province may purchase securities of an issuer incorporated or primarily operating elsewhere, listed on multiple exchanges. Courts have held that for secondary market civil liability, the governing law will often be the law of the jurisdiction where the investor acquired the securities, provided the issuer has a real and substantial connection to that jurisdiction as defined by the legislation. In some cases, Canadian courts have stayed or declined to hear proposed secondary market class actions in favour of foreign proceedings — particularly where the issuer has minimal continuing ties to Canada or where parallel litigation elsewhere is more closely connected to the dispute.
The interplay between statutory schemes and common law continues to evolve. Courts are still refining the boundaries between statutory and non-statutory remedies, the extent to which reliance can be presumed in different contexts, and the role of foreign legal theories such as fraud on the market. The Canadian approach reflects a deliberate decision not to simply import U.S. models, but to adapt them in light of domestic policy choices about market integrity, investor protection, and the health of public capital markets. For practitioners and clients engaged in securities litigation, staying attuned to these developments — both doctrinal and practical — is essential to navigating a field where legal rules, market practices, and regulatory expectations are closely intertwined.
Common Questions
Securities litigation refers to legal disputes involving violations of securities laws, which govern the issuance, trading, and regulation of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, and derivatives. This type of litigation typically arises from allegations of misrepresentation, insider trading, market manipulation, or breaches of fiduciary duty.
Misrepresentation can occur when companies provide false or misleading information in their financial statements or prospectuses, leading investors to make decisions based on incorrect data. Insider trading involves trading based on non-public, material information, giving an unfair advantage. Market manipulation includes actions like pump-and-dump schemes, where the value of a security is artificially inflated to sell at a profit, followed by a sharp decline in value.
Securities litigation aims to protect investors, ensure market integrity, and maintain investor confidence by holding wrongdoers accountable. It can involve class actions, regulatory enforcement actions, or individual lawsuits, and may result in remedies such as damages, disgorgement of profits, and injunctive relief.
Common types of securities law violations include misrepresentation, insider trading, market manipulation, and breaches of fiduciary duty. Misrepresentation involves providing false or misleading information about a company's financial health or prospects in prospectuses, financial statements, or public announcements, leading investors to make decisions based on inaccurate information.
Insider trading occurs when individuals with access to non-public, material information about a company trade its securities, exploiting that privileged knowledge for personal gain. Market manipulation encompasses tactics used to artificially affect the price or volume of a security, such as spreading false rumours, wash trades, or pump-and-dump schemes. Breaches of fiduciary duty involve corporate directors or officers failing to act in the best interests of shareholders — including self-dealing, conflicts of interest, or failing to disclose critical information.
Regulators like the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) enforce securities laws to detect, investigate, and penalize these violations. Legal recourse for affected investors includes civil litigation to recover losses and regulatory actions that impose fines, sanctions, and corrective measures.
Typically, no. One hallmark of Ontario's secondary market liability regime is that plaintiffs do not have to prove they individually read or directly relied on the issuer's continuous disclosure. Instead, the law presumes that material misrepresentations or omissions cause market prices to be artificially inflated (or deflated) and thus harm all who trade in that window. Because shares on a public exchange reflect the perceived content of corporate disclosures, anyone who buys at the inflated price is effectively impacted.
However, the plaintiff class must still establish that the misrepresentation or omission was material — meaning it would have significantly influenced a reasonable investor's decision. Once that is shown, statutory liability often shifts the burden onto defendants to prove defences such as having performed rigorous due diligence or lacking knowledge of the falsehood.
While each plaintiff typically must show they acquired or disposed of shares during the period of misrepresentation, demonstrating direct reliance on a specific press release is not mandatory. This statutory shift eases the litigation process, enabling large groups of investors to hold issuers accountable for misleading the market at large.
The potential outcomes of securities litigation vary widely but generally include monetary damages, injunctive relief, settlements, and regulatory penalties. Monetary damages are the most common outcome, where the court orders the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for financial losses — including both direct losses and, in some cases, punitive damages designed to punish egregious conduct and deter future violations.
Injunctive relief involves court orders compelling the defendant to take specific actions or refrain from certain activities, such as correcting misleading disclosures, ceasing illegal trading practices, or implementing improved corporate governance measures.
Settlements are also a frequent outcome, where the parties agree to resolve the dispute without a trial. In class action cases, settlements must be approved by the court to ensure fairness to all class members. Regulatory penalties can accompany or follow litigation — the Ontario Securities Commission may impose fines, sanctions, or other corrective measures, and in some instances violators may be disqualified from serving as directors or officers of public companies.
Even if no private civil claims are filed, the Ontario Securities Commission can independently investigate and prosecute an issuer suspected of providing false or misleading disclosure. The OSC's mandate includes safeguarding the public interest — fining violators, issuing cease-trade orders, or imposing bans on directors and officers. Such administrative sanctions aim to protect Ontario's capital markets from recurrent or egregious misconduct.
The OSC might resolve the matter through a settlement: the issuer admits to certain breaches, pays an administrative penalty, and commits to corrective measures. That administrative outcome does not automatically yield compensation for investors who lost money, nor does it bar them from bringing a lawsuit. If no investors step forward, it may mean the losses were minor or the wrongdoing remained undiscovered by those affected.
If shareholders eventually discover their losses stemmed from the misconduct identified by the OSC, they could initiate civil litigation later, though they must heed limitation periods. Private suits are investor-driven and focus on personal or class compensation, whereas the OSC addresses overall market integrity and deters wrongdoing.
Insider trading typically triggers regulatory penalties first, with the Ontario Securities Commission investigating suspicious trades or abrupt price movements. If the OSC concludes an insider profited from undisclosed material information or tipped off others, it can impose fines, trading bans, or settlement orders. However, private litigants — particularly shareholders who claim losses — may also seek redress through civil lawsuits, arguing that the insider's illicit trade distorted market pricing or deprived them of the chance to act on equal footing.
Civil suits over insider trading often hinge on proving the insider had specific, non-public knowledge that was unquestionably material and that the trading occurred before that knowledge reached general investors. Courts can order the insider to disgorge illicit profits or pay damages if a strong causal link emerges.
The difference from regulatory penalties lies in the objective: the OSC punishes and deters violations in the public interest, while civil litigants focus on achieving compensation for the specific injuries they incurred. An OSC settlement does not automatically yield compensation for investors who lost money, nor does it bar them from bringing a lawsuit independently.
Not every small error or oversight in a prospectus leads to liability. Canadian securities legislation — and the courts — require that the misrepresentation be material, meaning it would reasonably affect an investor's decision to buy or sell the security. If the falsehood is trivial and would not change a prudent investor's perception of risk or value, the law usually will not attach liability.
From an investor's perspective, material facts often revolve around potential earnings, major product lines, reputational hazards, or financing arrangements. If crucial negative information is purposely omitted or overshadowed, or if positive data is grossly exaggerated, the investor's ability to judge the risk is compromised.
Plaintiffs in litigation usually demonstrate materiality by referencing how share prices or investment decisions pivoted upon the revelation or concealment of such facts. Defendants typically argue the omitted or misstated data would not sway a typical investor's mind, or that disclaimers clarified uncertainties. Ultimately, the materiality test is pragmatic, focusing on whether a rational investor would find the discrepancy substantial in deciding to invest.
Securities Litigation
For investors and plaintiffs, the secondary market liability regime under the Securities Act creates meaningful rights, but those rights come with a leave requirement, a causation analysis, and damages caps that require careful navigation from the outset. For issuers, directors, and officers defending a claim, the due diligence defence and the statutory limits on recoverable loss are the terrain where these cases are actually resolved. Grigoras Law acts for investors, issuers, directors, and market intermediaries on securities disputes before the courts and in coordination with OSC proceedings.

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