Labour Dispute Intimidation
Representation in picketing disputes, unlawful strike threats, and union coercion matters. Analysis of threatened breaches and rapid injunctive applications.
Jump to sectionEconomic Torts
Grigoras Law represents clients across Ontario in intimidation matters involving unlawful threats, coercion, and economic pressure. We act for both plaintiffs seeking remedies for harm caused by threatening conduct and defendants facing intimidation allegations. Our work includes rapid assessment of threat elements, strategic analysis of intent and causation, injunctive relief where warranted, and comprehensive claims that establish unlawful pressure and quantifiable damages.
What We Do
Representation in picketing disputes, unlawful strike threats, and union coercion matters. Analysis of threatened breaches and rapid injunctive applications.
Jump to sectionCompetitor threats, regulatory intimidation, and property dispute coercion. Strategic response to economic pressure tactics and unlawful demands.
Jump to sectionDetermining whether threats are actionable, distinguishing lawful rights assertion from coercion, and two-party vs. three-party framework application.
Jump to sectionEmergency motions to restrain ongoing threats and coercive conduct. RJR-MacDonald test application and irreparable harm demonstration.
Jump to sectionChallenging elements systematically, asserting lawful rights defence, and contract vs. tort distinctions. Limitation period and abuse of process arguments.
Jump to sectionProving or disproving intent to injure, establishing submission to threats, and causation chain documentation. Evidence gathering and witness preparation.
Jump to sectionYour Legal Team

Counsel, Civil & Appellate Litigation

Counsel, Civil & Appellate Litigation
Representative Work
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Intentional torts and family law intersection
Acted as defence counsel defending against counterclaim allegations of assault, verbal abuse, financial control, and intimidation in a marriage breakdown. Strategic issues included qualified privilege analysis, limitation periods under s. 16(h.2) of the Limitations Act, and abuse of process arguments.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Multi-party conspiracy and coordinated intimidation
Represented plaintiffs in neighbour dispute involving allegations of systematic harassment, intimidation, and property damage. Claims included civil conspiracy (unlawful means and predominant purpose), nuisance, trespass, and intentional infliction of mental suffering involving coordinated conduct designed to force plaintiffs from their property.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice · Fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional torts
Acted as plaintiff's counsel in matter involving systematic emotional abuse, manipulation, and financial exploitation in romantic relationship. Claims included intentional infliction of mental distress, relationship fraud, and intimidation through psychological tactics including gaslighting, threats to destroy reputation, and isolation from support networks.
Insights & Coverage
Intimidation is an economic tort that protects against harm caused by unlawful threats. The tort arises when one party issues an unlawful threat to another party with the intention of pressuring them to act (or refrain from acting) in a way that causes damage either to the person threatened or to a third party. This common law tort serves as an essential safeguard against coercion in commercial relationships, employment contexts, and other situations where economic pressure can be wielded as a weapon.
The modern law of intimidation was comprehensively defined by the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.), a landmark decision that established the tort's fundamental elements and confirmed its place in Canadian common law. The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently treated Rookes v. Barnard as good law in Central Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42, cementing the tort's application in Ontario and across Canada.
Unlike defamation, which protects reputation, or negligence, which addresses carelessness, intimidation specifically targets deliberate coercion through unlawful threats. The tort recognizes that threats can be more potent instruments of control than actual wrongful acts because they create uncertainty and fear, compelling submission before the threatened harm materializes.
Intimidation manifests in two distinct forms, each with its own analytical framework:
Two-party intimidation occurs when the unlawful threat is directed at the plaintiff, who suffers harm as a direct result of submitting to the threat. For example, if A threatens B with unlawful conduct unless B discontinues their business, and B complies to avoid the threatened harm, B may have a claim for two-party intimidation.
Important limitations apply to two-party intimidation. The Supreme Court of Canada held in Central Canada Potash that where the parties are bound by contract, a threatened breach of that contract is not actionable in tort because contractual remedies are available. The court reasoned that allowing a tort action in such circumstances would undermine the distinction between contract and tort law. This means two-party intimidation cannot typically be founded on threats to breach a contract to which the plaintiff is a party.
Three-party intimidation involves A threatening B in order to compel B to act in a way that injures C. This was the scenario in Rookes v. Barnard, where union officials threatened the plaintiff's employer (BOAC) with strike action unless the employer dismissed the plaintiff. The threats were directed at BOAC, but the intended victim was the plaintiff employee, Rookes, who lost his employment as a result.
The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in A.I. Enterprises Ltd. v. Bram Enterprises Ltd., 2014 SCC 12, that three-party intimidation is now largely subsumed within the broader tort of causing loss by unlawful means. However, the Court also reaffirmed that two-party intimidation remains viable as a distinct cause of action. Understanding this distinction is crucial for proper pleading and strategic litigation planning.
The origins of intimidation trace back to early common law cases involving threats of violence to potential customers, workmen, or tenants. Cases such as Earl of Shrewsbury's (1610), 77 E.R. 793, and Tarleton v. M'Gawley (1794), Peake N.P. 205, recognized that using unlawful threats to interfere with another's economic interests warranted legal redress.
Before Rookes v. Barnard, the tort existed in various forms but lacked comprehensive definition. The House of Lords decision in 1964 resolved several critical issues: it confirmed the tort's existence, established that threats of breach of contract constitute unlawful means (at least in three-party scenarios), and clarified the elements necessary to establish liability. Lord Devlin's analysis remains authoritative, stating that "if an intermediate party is improperly coerced, it does not matter to the plaintiff how he is coerced."
Canadian courts quickly adopted the Rookes framework. Early Canadian decisions including Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Building Material, Construction and Fuel Truck Drivers Union, Local 213, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.), and Gershman v. Manitoba (Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board), [1976] 4 W.W.R. 406 (Man. C.A.), applied intimidation principles in labour disputes and regulatory contexts.
The tort serves an important function in protecting economic freedom. It prevents parties from using threats of unlawful conduct as leverage to extract compliance or cause harm. By requiring that threats be unlawful, the law preserves legitimate bargaining while prohibiting coercion through illegitimate means.
To succeed in a claim for intimidation, the plaintiff must establish four elements:
Each element serves a distinct purpose in separating legitimate pressure from tortious conduct. Lawful warnings, business negotiations conducted in good faith, and assertions of legal rights remain protected, while deliberate coercion through unlawful threats attracts liability.
A threat is "something which puts pressure on the person to whom it is addressed to take a particular course of action." It must be coercive conduct demanding a particular action or abstinence. The threat need not be express; implied threats or superficially polite language can suffice if the coercive intent is clear.
Critically, the threat must be to do something unlawful. As Lord Reid stated in Rookes v. Barnard: "So long as the defendant only threatens to do what he has a legal right to do he is on safe ground ... but there is a chasm between doing what you have a legal right to do and threatening to do what you have no legal right to do."
Categories of unlawful threats include:
The distinction established in Central Canada Potash is critical: when A threatens B with breach of a contract between A and B, B's remedy lies in contract law, not tort. But when A threatens B with breach of a contract between A and C, intending to harm C, the threat can support liability under the unlawful means tort.
Courts have held that mere warnings do not constitute threats. In Stratford (JT) & Son Ltd. v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269 (H.L.), Lord Denning clarified that the threat "must be coupled with a demand. It must be intended to coerce a person into doing something that he is unwilling to do or not doing something that he wishes to do." A threat without a demand does not amount to intimidation.
Additionally, the threatened party must take the threat seriously. If threats are not credible or the recipient does not believe they will be carried out, no action lies. This was confirmed in Bartrop v. Sweetgrass Band No. 113, 54 Sask.R. 213 (Sask. Q.B.).
Intimidation, like other economic torts, requires intentional conduct. The defendant must intend to injure the plaintiff's legally protected interests. Negligent conduct is insufficient. As Lord Hodson stated in Rookes v. Barnard, intimidation is "actionable as a tort, if it is likely to harm the appellant and is followed by reasonably foreseeable damage."
Intent does not require personal animus or ill will. The test is whether the defendant desired the harmful outcome, knew it was substantially certain to occur, or acted with reckless indifference knowing harm was highly probable. In the words of Lord Devlin, in three-party intimidation "it must be proved that A's object is to injure C through the instrumentality of B."
The intent requirement creates particular issues when public officials exercise powers that are later found to be ultra vires. In Gershman v. Manitoba (Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board), the Board's blacklisting conduct was held to constitute intimidation because it was obviously aimed at the plaintiff. Similarly, in White Hatter Limousine Service Ltd. v. Calgary (City), [1994] 1 W.W.R. 620 (Alta. Q.B.), city inspectors who deliberately set out to injure the plaintiff's interests as a mode of enforcing compliance with a by-law (later found inapplicable) were held liable.
However, in Central Canada Potash, the Supreme Court found no liability where a Deputy Minister threatened lease cancellation to enforce a legislative scheme that was later declared ultra vires. The Court held that the Deputy Minister's intention was to enforce the statutory scheme, not to injure the company, even though economic injury was inevitable. This suggests that where public officials act in good faith to enforce what they reasonably believe to be valid law, the intent element may not be satisfied.
The characterization of the defendant's conduct in moral terms becomes crucial in public official cases. As a matter of policy, only willful abuse of public powers directed at the plaintiff's interests will likely result in liability, rather than honest though mistaken enforcement.
The plaintiff must establish that the harm suffered resulted from the unlawful threat. The threat must cause the threatened party to submit to the coercion. If the threatened party resists the threat, no cause of action arises at that point—though other remedies may be available if the threat is actually carried out.
As stated in Stratford (JT) & Son Ltd. v. Lindley, the plaintiff must submit to the defendant's threat before the tort is complete. If B resists A's threat, B has no claim in intimidation at that juncture. Only when B submits, to their (or another's) detriment, does a cause of action arise.
If the threat induces the plaintiff to do what they are already legally obliged to do, causation fails. In such cases, the plaintiff suffers no actionable harm because they were bound to take that action regardless. This principle was discussed in Central Canada Potash.
Cases involving failure to prove causation include Vancouver Museums & Planetarium Assn. v. Vancouver Municipal and Regional Employees' Union, 27 B.C.L.R. 73 (B.C.C.A.), where the plaintiff could not show that losses were caused by the alleged intimidation.
Harm to the plaintiff must result from the intimidation. While damage typically takes the form of financial loss relating to employment or business, there is no logical reason why other forms of recoverable harm cannot be claimed, provided the kind of harm was what the wrongdoer intended to inflict or was a foreseeable consequence of such harm.
Very little damage will support the tort. In Circuit Graphics Ltd. v. C.A.I.M.A.W., Local 1, 31 B.C.L.R. 5 (B.C.S.C.), the court found sufficient damage where the plaintiff had to escort intimidated employees across a picket line and where there was reasonable probability of further damage from employees refusing to cross unless the coercive conduct was enjoined.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that a claim for deliberately inflicted injury to dignity can support intimidation. In McIlvenna v. 1887401 Ontario Ltd., 2015 ONCA 830, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that being expelled from a bar by unlawful threats, causing injury to dignity, was a sufficiently pleaded intimidation claim.
Damages are at large, meaning the court has broad discretion in assessing compensation. Aggravated and punitive damages should always be considered by plaintiffs where the defendant's conduct is high-handed or malicious. For interlocutory injunction applications, no damage need be shown if there is a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm would result absent the injunction.
The concept of "unlawful means" in intimidation differs depending on whether the claim involves two-party or three-party intimidation. This distinction, clarified in A.I. Enterprises Ltd. v. Bram Enterprises Ltd., has significant practical implications.
For three-party intimidation (now largely part of the unlawful means tort), unlawful means includes conduct that would be actionable by the third party if that party suffered loss. This "actionability" test was established by the House of Lords in OBG Ltd. v. Allan, [2008] 1 AC 1 (H.L.), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bram. Threats to breach contracts with third parties qualify as unlawful means because breach of contract is actionable.
For two-party intimidation, the test is narrower. As established in Central Canada Potash and confirmed in Bram, a threat to breach a contract between the defendant and the plaintiff is not unlawful means for intimidation purposes because the plaintiff has contractual remedies available. The court reasoned that allowing a tort action would improperly convert contractual disputes into tort claims.
However, this narrower approach to contract breaches in two-party cases does not necessarily apply to other types of threats. Criminal threats, tortious threats, and statutory violations may constitute unlawful means in both contexts. The Supreme Court in Bram noted there is "no general requirement of consistency in the elements of the economic torts."
The question remains whether threats to commit crimes could support two-party intimidation even though criminal conduct against a third party is not unlawful means for the unlawful means tort (because crimes are not civilly actionable by the victim of the crime). Logically, if the tort's purpose is to prevent illegitimate compulsion, the threat's illegitimacy—not just the actionability of the threatened act—should matter. This suggests the unlawfulness criterion for two-party intimidation may in some respects be broader than for the unlawful means tort.
The defence of justification has limited application in intimidation. The use of unlawful means generally cannot be justified, leaving little scope for this defence. As stated in numerous authorities, justification of unlawful means is not possible where such means comprise criminal or tortious conduct.
The matter was left open by Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard, but Lord Denning addressed it obiter in Morgan v. Fry, [1968] 2 Q.B. 710 (C.A.). There, he suggested that if workers were "trouble-makers who fomented discord in the docks, without lawful cause or excuse," the defendants might be justified in refusing to work with them. This obiter dictum goes no further than suggesting justification might be available where the unlawful conduct is a threatened breach of contract—and only in limited circumstances.
Martland J. in Central Canada Potash took the view that justification may be inapplicable in two-party intimidation situations because the plaintiff is restricted to contractual remedies. This further limits the defence's potential role.
It follows that justification has only a limited role, if any, in intimidation actions. Defendants are better served by challenging the elements of the tort—particularly whether the threat was truly unlawful, whether intent to injure existed, or whether causation and damage were proven.
Standard limitation periods apply to intimidation claims. In Ontario, the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, generally provides a two-year limitation period from discovery of the claim. However, section 16(h.2) creates an exception for certain sexual assault and family violence cases, providing that no limitation period applies where proceedings are based on assault, battery, or certain forms of family violence where the defendant and plaintiff were in an intimate relationship and the plaintiff was financially, emotionally, physically, or otherwise dependent on the defendant.
The application of this exception to intimidation claims in family law contexts has been addressed in several cases. Courts must determine whether alleged intimidation conduct constitutes assault or family violence under the exception, and whether the required dependency relationship existed. These issues are often pleaded alongside abuse of process arguments where claims previously raised in family court are later re-litigated as tort actions.
Intimidation frequently arises in labour disputes, particularly involving picketing and strike action. The tort has evolved primarily through cases where unions threatened employers or employees with unlawful strike action to achieve bargaining objectives.
Rookes v. Barnard itself involved a union threatening to strike in breach of a no-strike agreement unless the employer dismissed a non-union employee. The House of Lords held this constituted actionable intimidation. Canadian courts have applied similar principles in numerous labour cases.
Picketing does not automatically give rise to intimidation. As established in Vancouver Museums and Planetarium Assn. v. Vancouver Municipal and Regional Employees' Union, peaceful picketing during a lawful strike does not constitute intimidation merely because it may inconvenience others. However, where picketers use threats, create physical blockades, or engage in conduct calculated to intimidate employees from crossing picket lines, liability may arise.
In Circuit Graphics Ltd. v. C.A.I.M.A.W., Local 1, the court granted an injunction where picketers engaged in coercive conduct including slander designed to prevent employees from working. The judge found there was "evidence of an intention on the part of the picketers to compel the employees of the plaintiff to not work for the plaintiff and to thereby prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the services of those employees."
Numbers alone do not necessarily constitute intimidation. Courts distinguish between lawful informational picketing and unlawful intimidation based on the nature of the conduct, not merely the size of the group. However, where numbers create physical blockades or overwhelm access points, courts may find intimidation.
Intimidation has expanded beyond labour contexts into general commercial disputes. Modern applications include:
In the decision Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, 27 O.R. (3d) 215 (Ont. Div. Ct.), the court considered whether a campaign involving threats to boycott companies doing business with the plaintiff could constitute intimidation in a three-party scenario. While fraud typically does not support intimidation in two-party situations (as confirmed in Dusik v. Newton, 62 B.C.L.R. 1 (B.C.C.A.)), the dynamics differ in three-party cases.
Intimidation claims increasingly arise in family law contexts, particularly in marriage breakdown situations involving allegations of financial control, threats to restrict parental access, and psychological coercion. These claims often involve:
Courts must carefully analyze whether the alleged conduct meets the elements of intimidation, particularly the requirement of an unlawful threat. Assertions of legal rights, even if mistaken, generally do not constitute unlawful threats. As Central Canada Potash established, "the tort of intimidation is not committed if a party to a contract asserts what he reasonably considers to be his contractual right and that other party, rather than electing to contest that right, follows a course of conduct on the assumption that the assertion of right can be maintained."
The intersection with family court proceedings raises procedural issues. When parties raise intimidation claims in family court and later withdraw them in favour of pursuing them in civil court, courts may find this constitutes abuse of process. The principle is that claims between spouses arising from marriage breakdown should generally be dealt with in one proceeding in family court, not split between family and civil forums.
Successful intimidation claims result in compensatory damages for losses proven to flow from the unlawful threats. Financial losses may include:
Where the defendant's conduct is particularly egregious, aggravated damages may be awarded. These compensate for additional harm from high-handed, oppressive, or malicious conduct that increased the plaintiff's injury. Factors supporting aggravated damages include the defendant's awareness that their conduct was wrongful, deliberate targeting of the plaintiff, and continuation of threats despite warnings.
Punitive damages serve to punish conduct that is malicious, oppressive, and high-handed, and to deter similar behaviour. Courts consider whether compensatory and aggravated damages adequately denounce the misconduct or whether additional punishment is warranted. In A.S. v. Murray, [2013] NSWSC 733, exemplary damages were awarded in an intimidation case involving criminal extortion.
Injunctive relief is particularly important in intimidation cases because ongoing threats can cause continuing harm that monetary damages cannot adequately remedy. Courts apply the test from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, requiring the applicant to establish:
Where intimidation involves threats of continuing unlawful conduct, irreparable harm is often established because the plaintiff faces ongoing coercion that damages cannot remedy. The uncertainty created by threats—not knowing if or when they will be carried out—itself constitutes a form of harm warranting injunctive relief.
In Circuit Graphics Ltd. v. C.A.I.M.A.W., Local 1, the court granted an injunction restraining picketers from unlawfully intimidating employees, finding "reasonable probability of further damage being caused to the plaintiff by employees refusing to cross the picket line unless the coercive conduct... is enjoined."
Injunctions may restrain:
Early evidence preservation is critical in intimidation cases. Threats may be communicated verbally, through electronic messages, or implicitly through conduct. Documentary evidence includes:
Where threats involve picketing or public demonstrations, contemporaneous documentation through photographs, videos, and witness accounts becomes essential. Security footage and third-party observations provide objective evidence of the nature and extent of the intimidating conduct.
Plaintiffs pursuing intimidation claims should evaluate:
Strategic decisions include whether to pursue settlement negotiations, whether to combine tort claims with contract claims (where applicable), and how to sequence procedural steps for maximum effectiveness.
Defendants facing intimidation allegations should consider:
Successful intimidation claims require careful evidence collection and presentation:
Proving unlawful threats: The plaintiff must establish that specific unlawful conduct was threatened. This requires identifying the precise nature of the threat, when it was communicated, to whom, and what unlawful act was threatened. Implied threats must be proven through circumstantial evidence showing the coercive nature of the defendant's conduct.
Proving intent: While direct evidence of intent is rare, courts infer intent from the totality of circumstances. Evidence showing the defendant knew the threat was unlawful, targeted the plaintiff specifically, or persisted despite warnings supports the intent element. As noted in Circuit Graphics, "wilful blindness or constructive knowledge" may suffice.
Proving causation: Documentation showing the submission occurred in response to the threat is essential. Temporal proximity between the threat and the submission, evidence that the plaintiff would not have acted but for the threat, and statements acknowledging the threat's influence all support causation.
Proving damage: Financial losses require documentary support: employment records, business financial statements, property valuations, and expert economic analysis. Even where damage is minimal, as in Circuit Graphics, evidence of actual harm or probability of future harm can support the claim.
Expert evidence often proves necessary for complex damages calculations, market analysis, and establishing causation in business contexts. Plaintiffs should engage forensic accountants or business valuators early in commercial intimidation cases.
Intimidation claims raise several procedural issues:
Forum selection: Claims may arise in Superior Court civil actions, family court proceedings, or labour relations contexts. Understanding which forum is appropriate and whether claims should be consolidated is crucial.
Pleadings precision: Statements of claim must particularize the unlawful threat, the intent to injure, the submission and causation, and the resulting damage. Failure to plead any element properly may result in motions to strike.
Discovery: Examinations for discovery should focus on the defendant's knowledge of unlawfulness, the purpose behind the threats, and the foreseeability of harm. Documentary discovery should capture all communications related to the threats.
Summary judgment: Where facts are not in dispute and the legal issues are clear, summary judgment under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure may resolve the matter efficiently. However, intent questions often require trial.
Trial preparation: Intimidation trials often turn on credibility assessments, particularly where threats were verbal or implied. Witness preparation, cross-examination strategy, and effective presentation of circumstantial evidence become paramount.
Common Questions
Two-party intimidation occurs when the defendant threatens the plaintiff directly, and the plaintiff suffers harm by submitting to that threat. For example, if someone threatens you with unlawful conduct unless you discontinue your business, and you comply to avoid the threatened harm, that's two-party intimidation. The threat is directed at you, and you are the one injured.
Three-party intimidation involves the defendant threatening a third party to compel them to act in a way that harms you. The classic example is Rookes v. Barnard, where union officials threatened an employer with strike action unless the employer fired a particular employee. The threats were directed at the employer (the third party), but the intended victim was the employee who lost his job as a result.
The distinction matters legally. Three-party intimidation is now largely incorporated into the broader tort of causing loss by unlawful means, while two-party intimidation remains a distinct cause of action. Additionally, the definition of "unlawful means" differs between the two: in two-party cases, a threatened breach of contract between you and the defendant generally doesn't qualify as unlawful means because you have contractual remedies available. But in three-party cases, threats to breach contracts can support liability.
A threat is unlawful if it involves threatening to do something you have no legal right to do. As the House of Lords stated in Rookes v. Barnard, "there is a chasm between doing what you have a legal right to do and threatening to do what you have no legal right to do."
Unlawful threats include: criminal threats (assault, theft, property damage), tortious threats (defamation, battery, trespass), statutory violations (breaching regulatory obligations), and in three-party situations, threats to breach contracts. The threat need not be express—implied threats or superficially polite language can suffice if the coercive intent is clear.
Importantly, the threat must be coupled with a demand. You must be trying to coerce someone into doing something they're unwilling to do, or refraining from something they wish to do. A mere warning without a demand doesn't constitute intimidation. Additionally, the threatened party must take the threat seriously—if threats aren't credible or believable, no action lies.
There's an important exception for two-party intimidation: if the defendant threatens to breach a contract they have with you, that's generally not unlawful means for intimidation because you have contractual remedies available (you can sue for breach, seek specific performance, or get an injunction). The law doesn't want to convert contract disputes into tort claims.
Generally, no. The Supreme Court of Canada held in Central Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan that when parties are bound by contract, a threatened breach of that contract is not actionable in the tort of intimidation because contractual remedies are available to you. The court reasoned that allowing a tort action in such circumstances would undermine the distinction between contract and tort law.
Your remedies for a threatened contract breach are found in contract law: you can sue for anticipatory breach, seek an injunction to prevent the breach, apply for specific performance, or wait for the actual breach and then sue for damages. You're not left without recourse—you just have to use contract law, not tort law.
However, there's an important exception: if someone threatens to breach a contract they have with a third party in order to harm you, that can support an intimidation or unlawful means tort claim. The classic scenario is threatening your employer with contract breach unless they fire you. In that three-party situation, the threatened breach is unlawful means because it's actionable by the third party (your employer), even though you weren't a party to that contract.
The practical takeaway: if the threat involves breaking a contract between you and the person making the threat, pursue your contractual remedies. If the threat involves breaking someone else's contract to harm you, you may have a tort claim.
Yes, intimidation requires intentional conduct. You must prove the defendant intended to injure your legally protected interests. Negligent threats or accidental coercion are insufficient—the defendant must have desired the harmful outcome, known it was substantially certain to occur, or acted with reckless indifference knowing harm was highly probable.
However, "intent" doesn't require personal animus or ill will. The courts look at whether the defendant desired the result, knew it was inevitable, or was recklessly indifferent to the consequences. If someone deliberately uses unlawful threats to pressure another party, and harm to you is the obvious and intended result, the intent element is satisfied even if they claim they had nothing personal against you.
Intent can be inferred from the totality of circumstances. Evidence showing the defendant knew the threat was unlawful, targeted you specifically, persisted despite warnings, or made statements revealing their purpose all support proving intent. As one court noted, "wilful blindness or constructive knowledge" may suffice—you don't need to catch someone admitting "I intended to harm you."
In three-party intimidation, the test is whether "the defendant's object is to injure [you] through the instrumentality of [the third party]." In other words, was the whole point of threatening the third party to cause you harm? If so, intent is established.
Public officials who enforce the law face special rules regarding intimidation claims. The key question is whether the official was acting in good faith to enforce what they reasonably believed to be valid law, or whether they deliberately abused their power to harm you.
The Supreme Court addressed this in Central Canada Potash, where a Deputy Minister threatened to cancel mineral leases unless a company reduced production. The legislative scheme was later found to be unconstitutional (ultra vires), but the Court found no intimidation because the Minister's intention was to enforce the statutory scheme, not to injure the company, even though economic injury was inevitable.
However, when public officials act with the purpose of harming you—not merely enforcing the law—liability can arise. In Gershman v. Manitoba (Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board), blacklisting conduct was held to constitute intimidation because it was obviously aimed at the plaintiff. Similarly, in White Hatter Limousine Service v. Calgary, city inspectors who deliberately set out to injure the plaintiff's business by threatening customers and associates were held liable, even though they claimed to be enforcing a bylaw (which turned out not to apply).
The distinction is moral: honest though mistaken enforcement of regulations that turn out to be invalid doesn't typically support intimidation claims as a matter of policy (we don't want officials paralyzed by fear of being sued for every enforcement action that's later reversed). But willful abuse of public power directed at your interests—using enforcement authority as a weapon to harm you rather than to uphold the law—can be actionable.
Ontario's Limitations Act, 2002 generally provides a two-year limitation period from the date you discovered the claim. The clock starts when you knew or reasonably ought to have known: (1) that injury, loss, or damage occurred; (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant's conduct; and (3) that the conduct warrants a legal proceeding.
Importantly, the limitation period runs from discovery, not from when the intimidating conduct occurred. If you didn't realize you had a claim until later, the two years starts when you discovered (or should have discovered) the elements of your claim. However, there's also an ultimate limitation period of 15 years from the act or omission that caused the claim, regardless of discovery.
There's a significant exception for certain family violence cases. Section 16(h.2) of the Limitations Act provides that no limitation period applies where proceedings are based on assault, battery, or certain forms of family violence where the defendant and plaintiff were in an intimate relationship and the plaintiff was financially, emotionally, physically, or otherwise dependent on the defendant. Courts must determine whether alleged intimidation conduct constitutes assault or family violence under this exception, and whether the required dependency existed.
Additionally, if intimidation claims were previously raised in family court proceedings and then withdrawn, defendants may argue abuse of process—claiming that re-litigating the same issues in civil court after abandoning them in family court constitutes improper splitting of causes of action. This procedural defense can bar claims even within the limitation period.
The bottom line: don't delay. If you're facing intimidation, consult a lawyer promptly to protect your limitation period and avoid procedural complications.
Yes, injunctive relief is particularly important in intimidation cases because ongoing threats cause continuing harm that monetary damages cannot adequately remedy. Courts can grant interlocutory (temporary) injunctions while your case proceeds, or permanent injunctions after trial.
To obtain an interlocutory injunction, you must establish three things under the test from RJR-MacDonald v. Canada: (1) there's a serious issue to be tried (your intimidation claim has merit); (2) you will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction isn't granted (harm that can't be compensated by money damages); and (3) the balance of convenience favours granting the order (the harm to you from denying the injunction outweighs the harm to the defendant from granting it).
Irreparable harm is often established in intimidation cases because the uncertainty created by ongoing threats—not knowing if or when they'll be carried out—itself constitutes harm that damages can't remedy. You face continuing coercion that affects your ability to operate your business, maintain employment, or enjoy your property. In labour disputes involving picketing, courts have found that employees being intimidated from crossing picket lines creates irreparable harm to the business.
Injunctions can restrain: further threats or coercive communications; picketing or protests that cross the line into unlawful intimidation; contact with you or third parties for intimidating purposes; and specific conduct the defendant has threatened. The injunction essentially prevents the defendant from carrying out the threats or making new ones while the case proceeds.
Importantly, for interlocutory injunctions, you don't need to prove actual damage has occurred yet—the reasonable probability of future damage from continued threats can be sufficient. This makes injunctions a powerful tool for stopping intimidation before it escalates further.
Intimidation
If you're being pressured through unlawful threats, or defending against intimidation allegations, Grigoras Law provides strategic counsel. We analyze unlawful means, intent, causation, and damages to protect your interests in labour disputes, business conflicts, and civil litigation.

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